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THE UNKNOWN 
"GREAT DEBATES" 
HERBERT A. SELTZ, RICHARD D. YOAKAM 
In the eight years that have passed since the Nixon-Kennedy 
"Great Debates," Section 315 has remained unchanged, incum-
bents have shown little interest in debating, and a media legend 
has flourished. In retrospect, the sights and sounds of those four 
hours of broadcast history are easier to remember than the behind-
the-scenes planning and plotting, that was employed to deter-
mine the pattern and course of the debates. What follows is an 
examination of what could be termed the non-public debates; 
the in-fighting between the candidates' representatives to select a 
format and to consider a never-to·materialize fifth debate.1 
It was clear that the networks were going to provide extensive 
free time for the candidates in the 1960 election, either under 
existing "equal-time" provisions or under a desired suspension of 
Section 315. Some of the proposals made by the networks included 
time for the candidates to appear on existing or specially designed 
public affairs programs.2 The network's formal presentations were 
made to both parties immediately following Nixon's nomination 
in Chicago, on July 27. Apparently the NBC offer reached Kennedy 
first, and he accepted eagerly and without qualifications.3 Nixon 
stated his acceptance through his press secretary, Herbert Klein, 
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that same day, and confirmed it three days later. The other network 
proposals were also quickly accepted. Since both candidates favored 
the debates, it is not surprising that the House of Representatives 
approved Senate Joint Resolution 207 temporarily suspending Sec-
tion 315 on August 24, during its post-convention session. 
THE FORMATS 
The Meet the Press proposal, the debate idea, and Vice Presi-
dent Nixon's formal-acceptance wire all played major roles in 
determining the formats for the programs which were planned 
during the next six weeks. The details were hammered out in 12 
meetings between a committee of network news executives and 
the representatives named by the candidates. For the networks, the 
committee consisted of William McAndrew, Executive Vice Presi-
dent for News, NBC; Sig Mickelson, President, CBS News Inc.; 
John Daly, Vice President for News, ABC; and Joseph Keating, 
Vice President, MBS. Leonard Reinsch served as the chief adviser 
for Senator Kennedy, and William Wilson was his production 
adviser for radio and television; Fred C. Scribner Jr., Under Sec-
retary of the Treasury served as Nixon's chief representative, with 
Herbert Klein and Carroll P. Newton as advisers for radio-TV, 
and Edward (Ted) Rogers as technical adviser for radio and TV 
during the campaign.4 
The first meeting took place at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel 
in New York, August 9. It was agreed then that the "debates were 
desirable," that they should be on all networks simultaneously, 
one hour in length, end by October 21, and be worked into the 
candidates' travel schedules by mutual agreement.5 The Democrats 
wanted a later closing date but agreed on October 21. Subsequent 
meetings between the candidates' representatives helped to deter-
mine the dates. And, according to network representatives, the 
candidates' teams also talked about the format.6 Nixon, in his 
acceptance wire, gave the following general outline of what he 
wanted: "joint television appearances of the presidential candi-
dates should be conducted as full and free exchanges of views, 
without prepared texts or notes, and without interruptions ... and 
with time for questioning by panels of accredited journalists."1 
The network committee also came up with proposals. All of these 
ideas were discussed at a meeting in the Mayflower Hotel in Wash-
ington, on August 31, where the formats were established although, 
apparently, not agreed upon. 
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Fonnats for the first and fourth debates were quickly approved: 
opening statements, questions from the news panel, and closing 
statements. Kennedy drew the first position in the first debate, a 
tum of fate his advisers considered very important. Nixon, there-
fore, went first on the last debate. The candidates' representatives 
also gave the networks the dates and the cities agreed upon. The 
place of the second debate was later changed twice, and its date 
was moved up twenty-four hours.8 
The fonnat for the first and fourth meetings was the choice 
of the candidates' representatives. At the August 31 meeting, the 
networks, led by Mickelson, proposed that the candidates engage 
in what is known as "Oregon Debate."9 Under this fonn, debaters 
present opening statements, then are permitted to question each 
other directly. This suggestion was rejected by the candidates' 
representatives.10 Neither the networks nor the candidates' teams 
were in favor of an outright debate, on the grounds that it would 
not hold an audience. Furthennore, a major consideration for a 
good debate must be a relatively narrow, clear-cut issue on which 
the debaters can take definite stands. However, the candidates' 
representatives were frank to admit no such clear-cut issue existed 
in the campaign. While the candidates disagreed on methods and 
approach, degree and application of policy on both foreign and 
domestic issues, their representatives and the networks feared that 
use of a debate format to present such "shades of gray" arguments 
would result in rapidly diminishing interest from the audience. 
In the immediate background were the West Virginia Primary 
debates between Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey. Both men had 
been overly polite and the results had been disappointing. The 
debate fonnat, in the view of at least one of the leading repre-
sentatives, held hidden traps because accuracy of statements could 
not be checked immediately, and because one of the candidates, 
in the heat of an argument, could make an injudicious remark 
which would have immediate international repercussions.ll 
All of these considerations seemed to have prompted the can-
didates' representatives to insist upon the interposition of a panel 
of newsmen who would ask the questions. The representatives of 
both the candidates and the networks felt that such a format was 
well known to the American TV audience. To be fair, it must be 
pointed out that Nixon's telegram suggests a fonn closer to a 
straight debate than that used in the actual programs. The Meet 
the Press type of program, however, was specifically urged by 
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Nixon's representatives during the negotlatlons. Kennedy's repre-
sentatives said that they were not as interested in the format as in 
getting the Senator on the same TV program with the Vice Presi-
dent. They realized Kennedy's skill with the question and answer 
setup, and were really happier with it than with a straight debate 
format. 12 
Final format of the second and third debates was not established 
at the August 31 meeting. The candidates' representatives wanted 
the form that finally appeared on the air-question to candidate A, 
answer, comment by candidate B, question to candidate B, answer, 
comment by Candidate A. The network representatives objected 
to this form, claiming it would be confusing to the audience and 
would not permit much follow-up or expansion of views. They 
continued to battle for the "Oregon Debate" system up to a few 
days before the second debate went on the air in Washington; 
but they never succeeded. 
Concerning the subject areas of the first and fourth debates, 
it is not clear just how the idea of having one program devoted 
solely to domestic issues and another solely to foreign policy 
evolved, but once the idea of having a news panel ask the ques-
tions was established, it must have become clear that some control 
over the direction of at least some of the programs would have to 
be exercised. 
With the moderator, news panel format rather firmly entrenched, 
the question of who would serve in these roles also became an 
issue. The various factions wrestled with the idea of using a public 
figure as moderator. Along with other notables, the President of 
the American Bar Association was suggested. In the end, all sides 
agreed on a TV professional, to be selected by the network respon-
sible for a given debate. 
The selection of the news panel was a more difficult problem. 
Since the networks were putting on the programs, they insisted that 
the panels for programs one and four be made up of network 
newsmen, but agreed to 50-50 representation between the elec-
tronic and print media on debates two and three. Not more than 
10 days before the first debate, however, Press Secretaries Pierre 
Salinger and Herbert Klein opened the question again with a pro-
test-that the lack of newspaper reporters on the panels was dis-
criminatory. But the networks stuck to their guns, and told Klein 
and Salinger to devise a method for picking the print media rep-
resentatives on debates two and three. An elaborate lottery system 
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was established by the press secretaries to provide for newspaper, 
wire service, and magazine representation as the argument concern-
ing discrimination went on right up to' the day of the first debate. 
There is evidence that Senator Kennedy was pushing most strongly 
for more newspaper representation; the Republicans did not seem 
to have been as much involved in this discussion. Immediately after 
the first debate, Klein, who was prompted by requests, suggested 
the possibility of representation on the panel of special interest 
groups such as the civil rights advocates. The networks rejected 
the suggestion on the grounds that it would be impossible to 
satisfy all. 
Shortly after the August 9 agreement that there would be de-
bates, at least one network received inquiries from prospective 
sponsors as to whether the programs would be for sale. When the 
question was raised by House Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Committee chairman Oren Harris, NBC publicly explained that it 
would consider sponsorship of the programs unless the candidates 
objected.1s At the August 31 meeting, it was announced that there 
would be no sponsorship. 
THE FIFTH DEBATE 
The idea of a fifth debate was brought up publicly by Democrat 
Senators Pastore, Monroney, and Magnuson on October 8.14 The 
trio had sponsored the legislation permitting temporary suspension 
of Section 315 of the Communications Act, which made the debates 
possible. Consequently, when they wired the networks that they 
favored a fifth debate which was closer to election day, the Senators 
received immediate consideration. The networks implemented the 
idea immediately, and Senator Kennedy wired a blanket acceptance 
two days later, on October 1l,15 The Nixon reply the same day 
was not quite as all-inclusive, but he did accept the idea of more 
time. His proposal was to extend the fourth debate to two hours, 
with the second hour to be taken up with questions phoned in 
by the public. 
The situation developed into a barrage of public statements in 
which the candidates accused each other of not wanting to go 
ahead with the fifth debate idea. Kennedy, in all his public pro-
nouncements about the fifth debate, kept hammering away at 
the idea that the fourth debate was too far from election day. And, 
he flatly accused Nixon of being afraid to meet him again after 
October 21. Nixon's television representative, Fred Scribner, con-
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tinued to request an extension of the fourth debate to two hours. 
He proposed that telephone calls with questions from the public 
be handled by a moderator, and that each candidate have three 
minutes to answer. This is essentially what Nixon himself did in 
a nationwide TV marathon answering session from Detroit the 
day before the election. 
On October 19 Scribner called for "immediate meetings" in 
order to discuss the extension of the fourth debate to two hours, 
and Kennedy replied that he was agreeable to an extension, but 
that it was" ... in no way a substitute for another joint appearance 
in the final days of the campaign."16 
On the day of the fourth debate Kennedy wired Nixon again, 
urging a fifth debate, and perhaps more. He challenged Nixon 
to announce his acceptance of a fifth debate on the program that 
night. His wire said " ... In fact I believe that more than five 
debates would be helpful if the record were to be corrected 
properly."17 
Nixon seems to have been worried about his tactical position in 
all this. There is evidence that on the day of the fourth debate 
the Nixon camp had decided not to become involved in a fifth 
debate if they felt Nixon was ahead in the campaign at the end 
of the fourth. IS 
The Nixon strategists did, however, hold open the possibility 
of the fifth debate, if Nixon came off second best in the fourth.19 
Nixon also proposed turning over the fourth debate to the Vice 
Presidential candidates, and held out the possibility of a fifth debate 
if Kennedy agreed to this.20 In a 1,000 word telegram on October 
23, Nixon renewed the idea of putting the Vice-Presidential can-
didates on for at least part of a fifth debate, and suggested the 
whole time period be devoted to the question of Cuba, and what 
to do about Castro-an issue which had been touched on briefly 
during the fourth debate. Nixon's long wire devoted much more 
space to his views on Castro and Kennedy's point of view on the 
same subject than it did talking about arrangements for the fifth 
debate. Kennedy's reply, on the same day, was similar since it was 
primarily an attack on Nixon's point of view, although it was 
shorter. But, Kennedy rejected the idea of limiting the subject of 
the fifth debate to one item.21 
By October 25, the idea of a fifth debate seems to have been 
given serious consideration by both sides. Scribner and Reinsch 
met in Washington to discuss it once more, and the network com-
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mittee-McAndrew, Mickelson, Daly, and Keating-met in New 
York to work out a format. They wired Scribp.er and Reinsch, 
suggesting a return to the original network proposal-one more try 
for a real "Oregon Debate." The wire read: "We urge that you 
consider reverting to the original format; a face-to-face appearance 
without a panel, but with a moderator to preside and to provide 
for a fair division of time."22 The network representatives also 
suggested another modification of this plan-that the candidates 
present statements on subjects previously stipulated and that they 
reserve some time for direct questions. Reinsch and Scribner reached 
no decision on the 25th and met again on the 26th. On the 28th 
the network committee met again, and must have been convinced 
that there really would be a fifth debate. John Daly withdrew ABC 
from the production of the fifth debate, since ABC had already 
presented two, and CBS drew the assignment with the probability 
that it would originate in Washington on October 31. 
The next 24 hours must have been the wildest in the entire 
debate series as far as the network committee was concerned. Mick-
elson's personal memoranda on the debates includes a complete 
record of the activities.23 While the network committee was meeting 
in Mickelson's office in New York, Reinsch and Scribner were 
meeting in Washington. Faulty communications resulted because all 
sides were firing off telegrams to each other, and releasing the texts 
of the telegrams to the press before they were received at the other 
end. 
Scribner and Reinsch compromised on a format. First, they dic-
tated that the two Vice-Presidential candidates, Lyndon Johnson 
and Henry Cabot Lodge, would each make a ten-minute statement 
at the beginning of the program. The Presidential candidates would 
then work with a panel of newsmen as they had in the second 
and third debates, with the exception that the answers and com-
ments would continue for five minutes. An additional two minutes 
would then be given the first speaker for "sur-rebuttal." Since 
twelve-and-one-half minutes were necessary for each complete se-
quence, time for only three questions would remain after the 
Vice-Presidential candidates finished. Reinsch was less in favor 
of using the Vice-Presidential candidates than Scribner, but a call 
from Scribner later in the afternoon indicated that he and Reinsch 
had agreed they would appear on the program.24 
Somewhere along the way, the Republicans suggested that cam-
eras be set up in New York's Central Park, so that the candidates 
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could answer questions from anyone who wandered by-a truly 
soap-box approach.25 The networks pointed out that such a plan 
might attract a mob of 100,000 persons or more, and that it was 
impractical from the points of view of security, production, and 
engineering. 
Reinsch and Scribner both asked that the network committee 
come down to Washington the following day, October 29, for a 
meeting to work out production details. Mickelson agreed that 
he and McAndrew would go to Washington for the meeting, and 
it was scheduled for 11 a.m. at the CBS Washington headquarters. 
Reinsch promised to call back to confirm the meeting, and it looked 
as if a fifth debate would materialize. 
However, early in the afternoon of the 28th, Reinsch sent a wire 
under Kennedy's name which Scribner took as a personal affront. 
Scribner felt that the wording of the wire accused him of bad 
faith, and tried to make it look like the Republicans were resisting 
the fifth debate. Furthermore, he pointed out later, Reinsch released 
the text of the wire close to the time he and Scribner were meeting 
to discuss the final details of the fifth debate.28 
Reinsch did not call back, but sent word to Mickelson late that 
evening that some sort of a hitch had developed.27 Mickelson 
could not tell from Reinsch's message whether there would be a 
fifth debate; he and McAndrew went to Washington the following 
morning. Mickelson contacted both camps. He found Scribner 
very upset about Reinsch's wire. Scribner read Mickelson the text 
of his reply to Reinsch, in which he said that until Kennedy 
apologized for charging bad faith and withdrew what Scribner 
believed was an ultimatum, there could be no more negotiations, 
and there it ended. 
NOTES 
1. An attempt was made to suspend Section 315 for the 1964 presidential 
election but the White House showed little interest and the matter died. 
Early in 1968 the Radio-Television News Directors Association and others 
filed suit in the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th District chal-
lenging the so-called "Fairness Doctrine" and Section 315 on First Amend-
ment constitutional grounds. The United States Supreme Court then set 
aside other Section 315 appeals until this case, "RTNDA et al" is heard. 
The Staggers Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce Committee held hearings on suspension of Section 
315 and the "fairness doctrine" in the spring of 1968. 
2. The offer by NBC for 8 weekly hour long broadcasts of Meet the Press 
was made by NBC president Robert Sarnoff April 21, 1960 in a speech 
before the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences in New York. The offer 
by CBS of 8 hours of prime evening time between Labor Day and Election 
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was made by Dr. Frank Stanton in testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Communications of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee 
May 17, 1960. He proposed a variety of program types. ABC president 
Oliver Treyz, in testimony before the same committee, proposed each net-
work set aside S hours of its regular programming, picking the most-listened-
to time periods, and pre-empting the regular programs for special programs 
by the candidates. Sarnoff used the term "The Great Debates" in a wire to 
House Speaker Sam Rayburn in urging House passage of the Senate Reso-
lution. 
3. Kennedy's advisers told the authors they felt it was very important to be 
the first to accept, and thus "challenge" Nixon to the debates. The decision 
was quickly reached during a luncheon at Hyannisport, Mass., July 2S. 
4. Not all of these people attended every meeting; the composition of the 
meetings varied depending on what was to be discussed and other con-
siderations such as travel schedules. 
5. Leonard Reinsch told the authors that the most difficult part of the 
negotiations was schedule arranging. 
6. McAndrew told the authors that both sides had been working on formats 
between the August 9 and August 31 meetings, but that he felt the candi-
dates had virtually agreed on what they wanted before the August 31 
meeting. 
7. Text of the telegram from Nixon to the networks is in the networks' files; 
the ellipsis indicated is that of the authors. 
S. Interview with McAndrew, New York, April 6, 1961. Also "Ground Rules," 
memo adopted at August 31, 1960 general meeting. 
9. For a fuller explanation see "The Oregon Plan of Debating," Quarterly 
Journal ot SPeech, XII, (April 1926), pp. 176-IS0. 
10. McAndrew, Mickelson files. Stanton testimony before the Senate Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce Committee, January 31, 1961, and interview with 
Reinsch, Washington, April 4, 1960. 
II. Letter from Fred C. Scribner, April 9, 1961. 
12. Reinsch, op. cit. 
13. Text of wire from Sarnoff to Rep. Harris. 
14. AP dispatch, dateline New York, October II, contains the sense of the 
wire to the networks. 
15. Text of telegram in Mickelson's personal files. 
16. Exchange of wires between Kennedy and Scribner, October 19, 1960. 
17. Text of Kennedy wire to Nixon, October 21, 1960, CBS films. 
IS. Mickelson files. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Texts of exchange of telegrams between Nixon and Kennedy, Oct. 23, 1960. 
22. Text of wire to Scribner and Reinsch from McAndrew, etc. October 25, 
1960, CBS files. 
23. Mickelson memorandum dated October 31, 1960. 
24. Mickelson, op. cit. 
25. McAndrew hand-written notes read to authors, April 6, 1961. 
26. Text of telegrams exchanged between Scribner and Reinsch, October 29, 
1960, CBS films. 
27. Mickelson, op. cit. 
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